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In a court challenge to a state administrative agency action, may the
attack be based on the decisionmaking deliberations of the agency mem-
bers, and may a reviewing court overturn the agency decision on the
basis of the deliberations? These issues were recently posed to the Col-
orado Court of Appeals in a 1991 case, Board of County Commissioners of
Park County v. Water Quality Control Commission (Park County).' The Colo-
rado district court in Park County overturned a rulemaking action of the
Water Quality Control Commission (Commission), basing its decision
largely on the Commission's deliberations. 2 'In upholding the district
court's ruling, the court of appeals held that when a trial court reviews
agency rulemaking, it may "consider [the agency's] deliberations, in
conjunction with the rest of the record .... -
The question presented to the Colorado Court of Appeals was a
matter of first impression in Colorado. Because no appellate court deci-
sions from other states address the issue, the Park County case is impor-
tant precedent and influential in the practice of state administrative law.
The ability to use agency deliberations to attack agency action should be
helpful to lawyers who practice before state agencies. Prior to Park
County, attorneys based their challenges on the record before the
agency. After Park County, an attack on an agency rule may be based on
extra-record transcripts of agency deliberations.
The Park County rule will also affect the manner in which multi-
headed state boards and commissions conduct their deliberations. Un-
fortunately, the most likely effect of Park County will be to discourage
free and open debate among agency members during deliberations. If
an agency member knows that comments made during deliberations
may be used as grounds for appealing the agency's decision, an agency
member may choose to refrain from speaking during deliberations. If
there are deliberative discussions, the statements may either be ex-
tremely guarded and self-censored, or carefully articulated in order for
* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. The author was a mem-
ber of the Colorado Water Quality Control Commission, the agency involved in the Park
County case discussed below, from 1985-1991.
The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Priscilla McLain and
Elena Eisenberg, students at the University of Denver College of Law, in the preparation
of this paper.
1. 809 P.2d 1107 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 1991 Colo. LEXIS 853 (Dec. 3,
1991).
2. See id. at 1109.
3. Id.
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attorneys to better attack (or defend) the eventual agency decision. The
absence of meaningful deliberations and the use of self-censored delib-
erations or deliberations designed strictly for judicial review, seem in-
consistent with what is probably the key purpose of deliberations-to
permit a multi-headed agency to freely examine facts, law and policy
with the goal of reaching a consensus prior to making a decision.
This Article considers the question of whether agency deliberations
may, or should, be used by courts reviewing the validity of agency
rulemaking actions. This question is answered in part by the Colorado
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a statute similar to APAs adopted
by other states. Of particular importance are the provisions of the APA
addressing: (1) the materials comprising the official agency rulemaking
"record; '" 4 (2) the requirement that the record include a statement of
basis and purpose outlining the agency's reasons for adopting a particu-
lar rule;5 (3) the extent to which the record constitutes the exclusive
basis forjudicial review of agency action;6 and (4) the grounds provided
reviewing courts for setting aside agency action.7 The question is also
answered by considering the deferential standard of review that has
evolved in Colorado and other jurisdictions for courts reviewing agency
rulemaking actions.8 The Article addresses these matters after briefly
summarizing the facts of the Park County case and the reasoning used by
the district court and court of appeals to justify the use of deliberations.
The Article argues that the Park County holding and rationale appear
wrong, both as a matter of law and in light of the reality of administra-
tive decisionmaking. As a matter of law, permitting reviewing courts to
use agency deliberations is grossly inconsistent with well-established
norms governing judicial review of agency action. These norms include:
(1) traditional exclusive reliance on the written record presented to the
agency; (2) statutory recognition of the agency's reasons for adopting a
rule being contained only in the official agency statement of basis and
purpose; (3) the extremely deferential judicial standard of review used
when considering agency actions; and (4) the philosophy behind the
well-established mental process rule. As a matter of administrative
agency decisionmaking and contrary to the court of appeals' view,
agency deliberations are not analogous to legislative history. Moreover,
courts should not consider agency deliberations to be a reliable source
of agency intent.
II. THE PARK COUNTY CASE
The facts in Park County appear quite frequently in state multi-
headed agency proceedings, particularly when these agencies are en-
gaged in rulemaking and the purpose of the rule is to establish an envi-
4. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(8.1)(b) (1988).
5. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(4)(a)(c) (1988).
6. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(8.1)(c) (1988).
7. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-4-106(7) (1988).
8. See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
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ronmental standard. State agencies typically set environmental
standards without the benefit of perfect information. 9 When the avail-
able data is incomplete or of questionable reliability, a multi-headed
agency must decide how, or whether, to use the data in establishing
standards. This usually entails considerable debate among agency mem-
bers during deliberations.
Such was the case when the Commission held a hearing and con-
ducted deliberations regarding water quality standards for various met-
als found in a segment of the South Platte River within Park County,
Colorado. The hearing was held because the City of Denver (Denver)
asked the Commission to make the water quality standards for these
metals more lenient in order to reflect the ambient levels of those metals
found in the segment. 10 Denver had previously compiled water quality
data for the metals in question in conjunction with its investigation of
the proposed Two Forks dam and reservoir project." During the hear-
ing, the Colorado Water Quality Control Division and the Colorado Di-
vision of Wildlife argued against using Denver's data to make water
quality standards more lenient.12 Since Denver's data was at or near the
detection limits for the metals, these agencies were concerned that the
data was "skewed" and would result in an inflated water quality standard
when incorporated into the Commission's mean-plus-standard-devia-
tion methodology.' 3
9. See generally Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive
Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917 (1990); Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating
Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions in Protective Environmental Decisionmaking, 15 HARV. ENv'rL.
L. REv. 327 (199 1); Vern R. Walker, The Siren Songs of Science: Toward a Taxonomy of Scientific
Uncertainty for Decisionmakers, 23 CONN. L. REv. 567 (1991).
10. In March, 1987, the Colorado Water Quality Control Commission held a triennial
review hearing concerning water quality standards and classifications for the South Platte
River Basin as required by COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-202(l)(f) (1989). In the course of that
review, the City and County of Denver (Denver), acting by and through its Board of Water
Commissioners, proposed that certain changes be made in specified numeric standards for
water quality in the mainstream of the North Fork of the South Platte River. Denver pro-
posed a change in the numeric standards for lead, cadmium and silver for Segment Four of
the North Fork to reflect ambient levels actually found in Segment Four. Volume II of
Record at 270, 273, 354, Park County v. Water Quality Control Comm'n (Park County
Colo. Dist. Ct. Nov. 27, 1989) (No. 88CV75) [hereinafter Record]. See also Park County, 809
P.2d at 1108.
11. Denver compiled and developed extensive water quality data on Segment Four as
part of the Environmental Impact Statement for the Two Forks project. The data con-
vinced Denver that the existing numeric standards for the three metals did not reflect
ambient water quality in the segment. The data also convinced Denver that the Commis-
sion's standards did not accurately reflect then-existing ambient water quality when the
standards took effect in 1981 because there were no new human-made sources of pollution
to account for any change since that time. Record, supra note 10, at 354, 358. See Park
County, 809 P.2d at 1108.
12. Record, supra note 10, at 693, 811. See also Park County, 809 P.2d at 1110 ("All
parties to the rule-making proceeding agreed that the data concerning cadmium and lead
were severely skewed rather than normally distributed.").
13. Record, supra note 10, at 693, 811-813. The mean-plus-standard-deviation meth-
odology is a statistical technique sometimes used by rule-making agencies in determining
standards based on empirical data. The methodology assumes the presence of normally
distributed data. Using the methodology, a numerical standard is established by adding
one standard deviation to the mean (average) of all the data points. The standard devia-
tion will vary according to the scattering of the data. The more widely scattered the data is
1992]
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After closing the record, the Commission began to deliberate.
Transcripts of the Commission's deliberations reveal that several com-
missioners were troubled by the data.' 4 Concerns were expressed about
selecting representative years for the data base, treatment of data at de-
tection limits and the water quality standards that might result when the
mean-plus-standard-deviation was calculated from the data.' 5 One
commissioner stated that the lack of "normal" data would produce a
metals standard that was "real arbitrary."' 16 Nonetheless, by a vote of 7-
1, the Commission adopted new relaxed standards based largely on the
data supplied by Denver. 17 This new standard was accompanied by a
"statement of basis and purpose," which was adopted by the Commis-
sion.18 . The APA requires agencies to submit the statement with every
agency rule, indicating the reasons officially adopted by the agency for
the rule.19
The Commission's new standards were then challenged before a
Colorado trial court, which ruled that the standards were both "unsup-
ported by substantial evidence in the record" and "arbitrary and capri-
cious. '"20 The trial court referred to comments during deliberations
where individual commissioners voiced concerns about the adequacy of
the data, concluding "it appears . . . that the additional data used to
support the proposed change [in the standards] was highly suspect."
'2 1
The Colorado Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court may con-
sider agency deliberations in reaching its decision. 2 2 The court of ap-
peals offered two reasons for this conclusion. First, the court decided
that the "mental process" rule, which otherwise prohibits inquiry into a
decisionmaker's reasoning, is inapplicable when the agency is not acting
from the fiftieth percentile (e.g., between ten and ninety percent), the larger the standard
deviation. The less scattered the data (e.g., between forty-five and fifty-five percent), the
smaller the standard deviation. See also Park County, 809 P.2d at 1108 (construing Depart-
ment of Health Regulation No. 3.8.8(V)(7), 5 COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 1002-8 (1989)).
14. Agency deliberations are open to the public under the Colorado "Sunshine Law."
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402 (1988).
15. Record, supra note 10, at 155-202.
16. Id. at 189.
17. Opening Brief at 3, Board of County Comm'rs v. Water Quality Control Comm'n,
809 P.2d 1107 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991)(No. 90CA0077).
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(4)(c) (1988).
19. Id.
20. Park County v. Water Quality Control Comm'n, No. 88CV75, at 4, 7 (Park County
Colo. Dist. Ct. Nov. 27, 1989).
21. Id. at 4. A close reading of the trial court's decision reveals an important ambigu-
ity. The trial court stated that "the record" does not support the Commission's action,
and the court expressly relied on the Commission's "deliberations" to justify its conclu-
sion that the standards were unsupported by the evidence and arbitrary and capricious. Id.
at 3-4.
However, a transcript of the deliberations was erroneously included in the record filed
with the trial court. It is unclear from the trial court's decision whether its "record" in-
cluded the deliberations. If the record included the deliberations, then the trial court may
have erred in assuming that the official agency record includes the deliberations. If the
record did not include the deliberations, then the trial court may have assumed, perhaps
erroneously, that deliberations may be used apart from the record to review agency action.
22. Park County, 809 P.2d at 1109 ("Therefore, it was permissible for the trial court to
consider the Commission's deliberations ... in conducting its review.").
[Vol. 69:1
USE OF AGENCY DELIBERATIONS
in a quasi-judicial proceeding. 28 Since the Commission was engaged in
rulemaking, the mental process rule was not a bar to the use of Commis-
sion deliberations. 24 Second, the court of appeals reasoned that agency
deliberations concerning an administrative rule are analogous to legisla-
tive history concerning a statute. The court concluded that since legisla-
tive history is available to reviewing courts, transcripts of agency
deliberations should also be accessible on review.25
III. ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AN AGENCY ACTION
The Colorado APA permits a reviewing court to set aside agency
action that is either "arbitrary or capricious" or "unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence when the record is considered." 26 Conceptually, a trial
court has three choices when deciding whether to use these two grounds
to reverse an agency action. The trial court may: (1) rely only on the
administrative record; (2) base its decision entirely on deliberations
without reference to the record; or (3) consider the agency's delibera-
tions in conjunction with the record.
A. Judicial Review Based Only on the Record
1. Traditional Exclusive Reliance on the Record
Reviewing courts rarely overturn agency actions.2 7 However, when
they do, and when the basis for the court's decision is a finding of
agency action deemed "arbitrary and capricious" or "unsupported by
substantial evidence," the finding is inevitably based on judicial exami-
nation of the record before the agency. If a court characterizes an
agency action as arbitrary and capricious, the result is usually due to the
agency's disregard of the evidence presented at the hearing, and thereby
23. Id. ("Although Colorado has adopted the 'mental process rule' prohibiting inquiry
into a decision-maker's mental process ... this rule is inapplicable if the administrative
action does not result from a quasi-judicial proceeding.").
24. Id. The case cited in the court of appeals' opinion to support this proposition,
Hadley v. Moffat County Sch. Dist. RE-l, 681 P.2d 938 (Colo. 1984), held that the mental
process rule is inapplicable when two conditions are present: (1) the agency's action is
not quasi-judicial, and (2) there are specific allegations of agency misconduct. Id. at 944-
45. The second condition, agency misconduct, was not raised in the Park County case.
25. Park County, 809 P.2d at 1109. Again, the case cited by the court of appeals to
support this proposition, Colorado Dep't. of Social Serv. v. Board of County Comm'rs,
697 P.2d I (Colo. 1985), involves a different issue altogether. The court held that "post-
passage testimony of a legislator concerning [a statute] should not be admitted into evi-
dence on the question of legislative intent." Id. at 21.
26. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24-4-106(7) (1988). The Park County trial court used both
grounds in its decision overturning the Commission's standards. Park County, 809 P.2d at
1108 ("the trial court ruled.., that the [Commission's] new standards are unsupported by
the record and are arbitrary and capricious.").
The APA also permits courts to hold unlawful agency action that is "otherwise con-
trary to law." CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24-4-106(7) (1988). These are actions that are in excess
of statutory authority or inconsistent with proper procedures. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 999, 1001 (Colo. 1987).
27. Courts generally employ an extremely deferential standard of review regarding
agency actions. See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
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made part of the record.28 If a court concludes that an agency decision
must be set tside, it is because the court believes that the evidence in the
record does not support the agency's action.
29
Reliance on the record would seem to preclude judicial use of
agency deliberations to overturn agency actions. The APA specifically
lists what "the agency rulemaking record shall contain," °30 and agency
deliberations are not included. Since by non-inclusion the APA excludes
deliberations as part of the record, and since the record is the traditional
basis for judicial overturning of agency action, it follows that extra-rec-
ord deliberations should not be used as the basis for setting aside an
agency action.
2. The Agency's Statement of Basis and Purpose as Part of the
Record
Although the APA fails to include deliberations as part of the
agency record, the APA expressly states that the agency's record shall
include the agency's statement of basis and purpose.3 1 This statement,
required to be submitted with each agency rule, provides the reasoning
process of the agency in adopting the rule.3 2 The statement of basis and
purpose is a consensus summary of the reasons why agency members
decided to take a particular action. The statement is adopted by agency
vote before the rule becomes final.
In Citizens for Free Enterprise v. Department of Revenue,3 3 the Colorado
Supreme Court explained that the statement of basis and purpose re-
quirement was added to the APA to provide reviewing courts a basis for
testing the agency's reasoning. The court stated:
Absent a statement of basis and purpose, a court can only guess
at the reasoning process that led to the adoption of the admin-
istrative regulation .... The statement of basis and purpose
... serves to provide a reference point against which the valid-
ity of the rule can be measured. It removes the review process
from the realm of speculation and provides a context within
which meaningful judicial review can occur.
3 4
The Citizens for Free Enterprise opinion also suggests that when a court is
considering an agency rulemaking action, judicial review should be lim-
ited to two sources: (1) the record before the agency at the time of
adopting the rule, and (2) the statement of basis and purpose explain-
28. See, e.g., Webster v. Board of County Comm'rs, 539 P.2d 511, 513 (Colo. Ct. App.
1975).
29. See, e.g., Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n v. Public Util. Comm'n, 760 P.2d 627, 641
(Colo. 1988); Home Builders Ass'n v. Public Util. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 552, 562 (Colo.
1986); Colorado Dept. of Social Serv. v. Davis, 796 P.2d 494, 496 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
30. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-4-103(8.1)(b)()-(IX) (1988).
31. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-4-103(4)(a), (c), (8.1)(b)(V)-(VI) (1988).
32. "The written statement of the basis ... and purpose of a rule... shall include an
evaluation of the ... rationale justifying the rule." COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(4)(c)
(1988).
33. 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1982).
34. Id. at 1062.
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ing the reasons for the rule. The Citizens for Free Enterprise court observed
that requiring "an administrative regulation be defensiblb in terms of
the agency's statement of basis and purpose, and with reference to the
administrative record... serves to... assure the effectiveness of subse-
quent judicial review."
3 5
The Citizens for Free Enterprise case seems to preclude the judicial use
of agency deliberations. The court assumes that the agency's record
(without deliberations) and the statement of basis and purpose should
be the sole evidence of agency reasoning. Jurisdictions other than Colo-
rado have likewise concluded that an agency's statement of reasons ob-
viates the need to consider the deliberations. One California appellate
court stated that "the requirement [that] the agency state [its] findings
makes it unnecessary to delve behind the findings for evidence of the
agency's actual deliberations; the full findings and administrative record
provide a sufficient basis for meaningful judicial review." 3 6 Similarly,
the federal rule states that "where an agency has issued a formal opinion
or a written statement of its reasons for acting, transcripts of agency
deliberations at Sunshine Act meetings should not routinely be used to
impeach that written opinion."
'3 7
Despite this persuasive rationale from jurisdictions outside Colo-
rado and the Citizens for Free Enterprise precedent within Colorado, both
the Park County district court and the court of appeals chose to ignore
the Commission's statement of basis and purpose. Neither the trial
court nor the court of appeals mention the existence of the statement of
basis and purpose. Both of these courts assumed instead that delibera-
tions, especially statements during deliberations by individual commis-
sion members, were a better indication of the entire Commission's
reasoning. This judicial use of deliberations, while ignoring the state-
ment of basis and purpose, is exactly what the Citizens for Free Enterprise
decision wished to avoid-a review process tainted with guesses and
speculation.
3 8
B. Judicial Review Based Only on Deliberations,
If the APA does not include deliberations as part of the agency rec-
ord, then how could the Park County trial court base its decision on the
Commission's deliberations and not the Commission's statement of ba-
sis and purpose? The answer seems to lie in a key section of the APA,
not cited by the trial court, which provides that "[t]he agency rulemak-
35. Id. at 1063. See also Anderson v. State Dept. of Personnel, 756 P.2d 969, 978
(Colo. 1988) (judicial review of an administrative agency determination should be limited
to the record before the agency).
36. County of San Diego v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. Rptr. 484, 492 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).
37. Kansas State Network, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 720 F.2d 185,
191 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 50 (1983) ("an agency's action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the
agency itself.").
38. Citizens, 649 P.2d at 1063 (use of "the agency's statement of basis and purpose"
[prevents] the courts [from being] "cast in the role of second-guessing the agency.").
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ing record need not constitute the exclusive basis for agency action on
that rule or for judicial review thereof."'3 9 This APA language gives the
court of appeals some statutory authority for its conclusion that courts
are "vest[ed] with discretion, in appropriate circumstances, to consider
the deliberations of the decisionmaking body in reviewing its actions."
40
Therefore, it may be somewhat irrelevant whether deliberations are al-
ways part of the record or whether the Park County district court incor-
rectly assumed that the Commission's deliberations were part of the
record. 4 1 The APA flatly states that reviewing courts are not limited to
the record. Since the APA allows judicial review of extra-record materi-
als, the question becomes whether agency deliberations may be the ex-
clusive basis for a court's decision, or whether they may, or should, be
considered only in conjunction with the record.
The Park County trial court seems to have based its decision almost
entirely on the Commission's deliberations, without much reference to
the record before the Commission when it made its decision. Such ex-
clusive reliance on agency deliberations by reviewing courts seems con-
trary to the language of the APA and to Colorado case law. While it is
true that the APA states that the record "need not constitute the exclu-
sive basis . . .for judicial review,"'4 2 this language does not state that
deliberations without the record may constitute the sole basis for judi-
cial review. The APA permits, at most, the use of deliberations as a com-
plement to the record. Use of the record has also been a necessary
condition to judicial review in virtually every Colorado case where an
appellate court has supported a reversal of agency action.43 The gen-
eral rule has been clearly articulated by the Colorado Supreme Court:
"In determining whether to disturb the determinations of [agencies],
the reviewing court must search the record .... 44
C. Judicial Review Based on Deliberations and the Record
In recognition of the critical role played by the agency record when
there is judicial review, the Park County court of appeals' opinion pro-
vides trial courts with "discretion, in appropriate circumstances" to con-
sider agency deliberations "in conjunction with" the record.4 5 This
holding seems to grant reviewing courts an open-ended license to use
deliberations whenever the court believes it to be "appropriate," as long
as the record is also considered. There are four difficulties with provid-
ing courts such limitless discretion to use agency deliberations.
39. COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-4-103(8.1)(c) (1988).
40. Park County, 809 P.2d at 1109.
41. The transcript of the deliberations was mistakenly submitted as part of the record
filed with the trial court. See supra note 19.
42. Park County, 809 P.2d at 1109.
43. See, e.g., Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n v. Public Util. Comm'n, 760 P.2d 627 (Colo.
1988); Colorado Dept. of Social Serv. v. Davis, 796 P.2d 494 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990). See
supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
44. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 763 P.2d 1037, 1041
(Colo. 1988).
45. Park County, 809 P.2d at 1109.
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1. Use of Deliberations Changes the Standard of Review for
Agency Actions
When a court considers the validity of an agency action, the general
rule is that the standard of review is deferential minimum scrutiny.
4 6
The standard of review is not strict scrutiny where a reviewing court
makes a searching inquiry into the motivation and rationale behind the
agency rule. Yet, to permit the Park County district court to closely ex-
amine deliberations, ignore the reasons set forth in the statement of ba-
sis and purpose and overturn an agency action based on the review of
deliberations is not limited deferential review, but a form of strict scru-
tiny.4 7 The change in the standard of review to strict scrutiny approved
by the Park County case is contrary to well-established Colorado prece-
dent regarding judicial review of agency action. Colorado courts have
consistently held that reviewing courts should seek to sustain, not over-
turn, agency rulemaking decisions.
This principle of judicial deference is reflected in six commonly
cited "rules of review" that have guided courts considering challenges
to agency action. Each of the six rules seems contrary to the liberaljudi-
cial use of agency deliberations to overturn agency decisions permitted
by the Park County case. First, a rule adopted pursuant to an administra-
tive rulemaking proceeding is presumed to be valid.48 The Commis-
sion's decision was not presumed to be valid in Park County. Second, in
determining whether to disturb the determinations of an agency, a re-
viewing court must search the record for evidence favorable to the
agency.49 In Park County, the reviewing court searched extra-record ma-
terial for evidence unfavorable to the Commission. Third, a reviewing
court should accord substantial deference to an agency exercising spe-
cial expertise in choosing among conflicting inferences.5 0 Although the
Commission was exercising its special expertise in choosing among con-
flicting standards, the reviewing court did not accord substantial defer-
46. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978).
47. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 568-74 (2d ed. 1988);
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTTLIONAL LAw 448-49 (12th ed. 1991). See also Deukmejian v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 751 F.2d 1284, 1325-26 (D.C. Cir. 1984), where the court
stated:
Were courts cavalierly to supplement the record [with agency deliberations], they
would be tempted to second-guess agency decisions in the belief that they were
better informed than the administrators .... The accepted deference of court to
agency would be turned on its head: the so-called administrative state would be
replaced with one run by judges ....
48. City of Aurora v. Public Util. Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1280, 1287 (Colo. 1990); AMAX,
Inc. v. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 790 P.2d 879, 883 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); People ey
rel. Woodard v. Brown, 770 P.2d 1373, 1376 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Agnello v. Adolph
Coors Co., 689 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Mitchell v. Charnes, 656 P.2d 719,
720 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
49. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 763 P.2d 1037, 1041
(Colo. 1988); see also U-Tote-M, Inc. v. City of Greenwood Village, 563 P.2d 373, 376
(Colo. Ct. App. 1977).
50. G & G Trucking v. Public Util. Comm'n, 745 P.2d 211, 216 (Colo. 1987).
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ence to the Commission's action. Fourth, when an agency rule is based
on a policy judgment, a reviewing court should not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the agency. 5 1 Although the Commission made a policy
judgment when it chose its standard, the reviewing court substituted its
judgment for that of the Commission. Fifth, judicial review of quasi-
legislative rulemaking actions of agencies is limited, and a court may not
substitute its opinion for that of the agency's.5 2 Although the Commis-
sion was undertaking a quasi-legislative rulemaking action, the review-
ing court substituted its opinion for the Commission's determination.
Sixth, whenever there is competent evidence in the record to support
the agency's decision, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment
for the agency's conclusion. 53 Although there was evidence in the rec-
ord to support the Commission's ruling, including the data supplied by
Denver, the reviewing court substituted its judgment for that of the
Commission.
2. Use of Deliberations Disregards the Mental Process Rule
By permitting the unlimited use of agency deliberations on review,
both the Park County trial court and the court of appeals disregarded the
"mental process rule." This rule, adopted by Colorado and the federal
courts, prohibits judicial inquiry into the deliberative processes of ad-
ministrative agency officials. 54 The United States Supreme Court articu-
lated the separation of powers rationale for the rule in United States v.
Morgan :55
[I]t [is] not the function of the court to probe the mental
processes of the [agency official]. Just as a judge cannot be
subjected to such scrutiny, so the integrity of the administrative
process must be equally respected. It will bear repeating that
although the administrative process has had a different devel-
opment and pursues somewhat different ways from those of
courts . . . the appropriate independence of each should be
respected by the other.
5 6
The mental process rule is primarily applicable to administrative pro-
51. Anderson v. State Dept. of Personnel, 756 P.2d 969, 974 (Colo. 1988); See also
Regular Route Common Carrier Conf. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 761 P.2d 737, 743 (Colo.
1988) ("proposed rule involves a policy judgment relating to the effective implementation
of a statutory purpose .... ").
52. See Colorado Land Use Comm'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 604 P.2d 32, 35
(Colo. 1979); Tihonovich v. Williams, 582 P.2d 1051, 1053-54 (Colo. 1978); AMAX, Inc.
v. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 790 P.2d 879, 883 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Bruce v.
School Dist. No. 60, 687 P.2d 509, 510 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
53. Sangre De Cristo Elec. Ass'n v. Public Util. Comm'n, 524 P.2d 309, 310 (Colo.
1974); Saint Luke's Hosp. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 702 P.2d 758, 761 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1985).
54. Public Util. Comm'n v. District Court, 431 P.2d 773, 777 (Colo. 1967); Board of
Educ. v. District Court, 483 P.2d 361, 362 (Colo. 1971); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n
v. Matthew, 557 F.2d 325, 333 (2d Cir. 1977); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d
63, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Braniff Airways v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453, 460 (D.C.
Cir. 1967). See also 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 17.5, at 295-
97 (2d ed. 1980).
55. 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
56. Id. at 422 (citations omitted).
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ceedings that are quasi-judicial in character. 57 Nonetheless, the rule
should also be applied to quasi-legislative rulemaking actions because
judicial review of such actions is more limited than the review of quasi-
judicial administrative matters. 58
There are two exceptions to the mental process rule, but neither
exception applies to the facts in the Park County case. First, the rule does
not apply when there are allegations of illegal or unlawful action, mis-
conduct, bias or bad faith on the part of agency members. 59 Second,
judicial examination of the decisionmaking deliberations of administra-
tive agency officials is allowed where there is an inadequate basis stated
for the agency's decision. 60 Absent these two exceptions, the mental
process rule should act to discourage judicial review of agency
deliberations.
3. Agency Deliberations Are Not Analogous to Legislative
History
The Park County court of appeals reasoned that agency deliberations
should be made available to reviewing courts because such deliberations
"are analogous to legislative history ... concerning a statute. '6 1 This
analogy is flawed for two reasons. First, the use of legislative history to
provide an authoritative interpretation of statutory text is increasingly
considered by judges as constituting an unacceptable form of judicial
"psychoanalysis" of the legislature. 62 Similarly, reliance on agency de-
liberations rather than the agency's statement of basis and purpose en-
courages risky judicial second-guessing, while simultaneously depriving
the agency of its officially adopted statement of reasons.
Second, to the extent that legislative history is used by courts, it is
only as a means of ascertaining the intention of unclear or ambiguous
statutory language.63 In Colorado, the rule is that "while the statements
of individual legislators may be helpful in determining the proper con-
57. Hadley v. Moffat County Sch. Dist. RE-I, 681 P.2d 938, 944-45 (Colo. 1984).
58. Bruce v. School Dist. No. 60, 687 P.2d 509, 510 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Polk v.
School Bd., 373 So. 2d 960 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
The Park County court of appeals' decision states that the mental process rule "is inap-
plicable if the administrative action does not result from a quasi-judicial proceeding." 809
P.2d at 1109. The case cited for this proposition, Hadley, instead holds that the rule is
inapplicable when there are specific allegations that the agency members acted improperly
(i.e., with bias or bad faith), and the agency's action does not resemble a quasi-judicial
proceeding. Hadley, 681 P.2d at 944-45. The Park County court of appeals' reliance on
Hadley seems misplaced in light of Hadley's requirement concerning allegations of agency
misconduct as a necessary condition to the rule's inapplicability.
59. Public Util. Comm'n v. District Court, 431 P.2d 773, 777 (Colo. 1967).
60. County of San Diego v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. Rptr. 484, 492 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).
61. Park County, 809 P.2d at 1109.
62. See Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2490 (1991) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953)
(Jackson,J., concurring)). See also Chisom v. Roemer, I11 S. Ct. 2354, 2376 (1991) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("When we adopt a method that psychoanalyzes Congress rather than reads
its laws, when we employ a tinker's toolbox, we do great harm.").
63. United States v. Stuart 489 U.S. 353, 373 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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struction of statutory language, such statements... will seldom be sufficient
to prove an impermissible legislative motivation." 4 Conversely, when
the meaning of a statute is clear it is improper to resort to legislative
history to divine legislative intent.
6 5
If the analogy regarding agency deliberations and the judicial use of
legislative history is viable, agency deliberations are relevant only if the
agency rule is so ambiguous that its construction needs further clarifica-
tion. When a rule is completely unambiguous, as was the Commission's
rule in Park County, it should be considered improper to use delibera-
tions to "discover" agency motive or intent.
4. Agency Deliberations Are Not Evidence of Agency Intent
A judicial rule permitting reviewing courts to use agency delibera-
tions to overturn agency action is, in effect, judicial approval of the no-
tion that deliberations are an accurate and reliable indicator of agency
intent. Such a rule presumes that statements during deliberations by
individual agency members may reveal to judges whether the ultimate
agency decision was arbitrary, capricious or not supported by evidence
in the record. This presumption is wrong for several reasons. First, oral
deliberations of a multi-headed agency regarding a complex evidentiary
record by nature focus only on certain aspects of the record, usually the
most controversial. Limitations of time and energy prevent a detailed
discussion of the entire record. As a result of this reality of the delibera-
tive process, a transcript of agency deliberations presents a very incom-
plete view of the record. Second, a transcript of deliberations is nothing
more than a series of statements by individual agency members. It is
foolish to impute to the entire decisionmaking body the comments ex-
pressed during deliberations by one or a few members of that organiza-
tion. This is a principle that is well established in the case law. 66 Even
the vigorous opposition of an agency member to an agency rule "does
not demonstrate, or even suggest, that the [agency] acted in an arbitrary
or capricious manner. '" 6 7 Similarly, statements by individual legislators
during their deliberations on a proposed statute are seldom sufficient to
prove impermissible legislative motivation. 68 Third, even if the state-
ments of individual agency members during deliberations reflect general
agency sentiment, it is impossible to know the motivation behind any
64. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State, 690 P.2d 177, 184 (Colo. 1984) (emphasis
added).
65. Commercial Energies, Inc. v. Cheney, 737 F. Supp. 78, 79 (D. Colo. 1990).
66. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) ("We have eschewed reliance [for
finding the Legislature's intent] on the passing comments of one Member .. "); Wein-
berger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982). See also News and Film Service, Inc. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 787 P.2d 169, 174 (Colo. 1990) (a comment by one member of a multi-headed
agency should not be interpreted as determinative of agency intent).
67. News and Film Service, 787 P.2d at 174. In light of the News and Film Service ration-
ale, it would be improper to assume that the Commission's rule in Park County was arbi-
trary and capricious because one commissioner stated during deliberations that the lack of
normal data would produce a standard that was "real arbitrary." Record, supra note 10, at
693, 811.
68. Archer Daniels Midland, 690 P.2d at 184.
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statement made or question posed during deliberations. It is improper
to infer that such statements and questions reflect an individual agency
member's viewpoint. An agency member may make a statement or ask a
question during deliberations to prompt further discussion, assist an un-
decided colleague, solidify another member's opinion or play "devil's
advocate."' 69 Whatever the motivation, it is impossible for reviewing
courts to know the reason behind any given statement or question ap-
pearing in the transcript of an agency's deliberations. To assume other-
wise is to encourage courts to engage in judicial "psychoanalysis," a
thoroughly discredited practice.
70
If a court wishes to review the reasoning underlying an agency rule,
it should consult the agency's statement of basis and purpose, not the
spontaneous statements of individual agency members during delibera-
tions. As the Colorado Supreme Court urged in Citizens for Free Enter-
prise,7 1 rather than initiating a de novo inquiry into whether the agency
rule is grounded in fact, "the court is directed to the administratively
compiled record [and the statement of basis and purpose]."
'7 2
IV. CONCLUSION
The rule articulated in Park County-that agency deliberations may
be used by reviewing courts to overturn agency actions-is poorly rea-
soned precedent. The rule is wrong as a matter of law and policy. Park
County will result in a disastrous chilling of free, open and candid discus-
sion during agency deliberations. 73 If the statements of agency mem-
bers during deliberations may be used against them by a reviewing
court, individual agency members may likely arrive at their own conclu-
sions before the deliberative process begins, thereby rendering delibera-
tions meaningless. In such a case, deliberations will not be a dynamic
exchange of views aimed at reaching a consensus. Rather, deliberations
will be a series of canned, prepared statements inserted to appease re-
viewing courts.
To avoid such a result, reviewing courts should use agency delibera-
tions in only three limited circumstances: when the agency rule is un-
clear, when there are allegations of agency misconduct, or when there is
an inadequate basis stated for the agency's decision. If a rule is ambigu-
69. This point is appreciated by attorneys who have experienced oral argument
before an appellate court. It is impossible to gauge the way ajudicial panel will vote solely
on the questions posed'at oral argument.
70. See supra text accompanying note 61.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
72. Citizens for Free Enter. v. Department of Revenue, 649 P.2d 1054, 1062 (Colo.
1982).
73. Inclusion in the record of documents recounting deliberations of agency
members is especially worrisome because of its potential for dampening candid
and collegial exchange between members of multi-head agencies. While public
disclosure stifles debate to some extent,judicial disclosure would suppress candor
still further since off-hand remarks could turn out to have a legal significance they
would not have if barred from the record on review.
Deukmejian v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 751 F.2d 1287, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (em-
phasis in original).
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
ous, resort to agency deliberations is analogous to judicial resort to leg-
islative history to construe an unclear statute.7 4 When there are
allegations of agency misconduct or an inadequate explanation for the
agency action, the use of deliberations is accepted when courts review
quasi-judicial agency action.7 5 This use should be extended to agencies
engaged in rulemaking.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
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